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held that the Respondent Webster (1) was partially dependent notwithstanding over $85,000 in savings and (2) that the Second Injury Fund
was not liable for dependency benefits beyond the initial 312 weeks of
benefits.
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STATEMENT OF SECOND INJURY FUND ISSUE ON APPEAL

Did the Industrial Commission commit reversible error when it held
that the 1979 Utah Legislative Amendment to U.C.A. Section 35-1-68 removed the
liability of the Second Injury Fund for dependency death benefits after the
first 312 weeks and, in effect, assigned the liability for all dependency
death benefits to the employer/carrier?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AS IT PERTAINS TO SECOND INJURY FUND LIABILITY

It is not controverted
husband

of

respondent

Anna

and the record

Webster

died

on

shows that Gene Webster

December

15,

1982

due

complications arising out of his industrial accident of July 20, 1979.

to
The

312 week period of statutory benefits from the date of injury ended in 1985.
At that time Mrs. Webster was receiving $179.00 per week.

She applied to the

Commission for continued benefits pursuant to Section 35-1-68, as amended in
1979.

The Second

amendment
removed
benefits

Injury Fund

declined

liability, pointing

out

that the

in 1979 by the Utah Legislature of Section 35-1-68, effectively
the

Second

after

Injury

Fund

from

the

liability

for

dependency

death

the 312 week period which had existed prior to the 1979

amendment •
Applicant requested a hearing which was held on June 26, 1985. The
Administrative Law Judge, in an Order dated July 2, 1985, held Mrs. Webster to
be

partially

dependent

and

ordered

the

self-insured

herein, to pay her $89.50 per week (R. 78-80).

1

employer,

appellant

Applicant filed two separate

Motions for Review.
widow

claimant

The first, filed on August 28, 1985, contended that the

is not

available to her.

a dependent

because

of

other

financial

resources

The Second Motion for Review was filed October 8, 1985 and

constitutes Appellant's first contention that the additional death benefits
should be paid out of the Second Injury Fund rather than by the employer as
Ordered by the Administrative Law Judge.
On January 9, 1986 the full Industrial Commission in a unanimous
Order Denying Motion

for Review, denied both Motions for Review and, as

pertaining to Second Injury Fund liability, specifically held that the 1979
amendment

to Section

35-1-68 deleted

the prior

language

in that

section

assigning liability to the Second Injury Fund for dependency benefits after
the 312 week period and replaced it with language assigning responsibility for
dependency benefits to the employer or insurance carrier [Section 35-1-68 (2)
(c) (iii)l.
On January 11, 1986, Appellant filed its Petition for Review with
this Court asserting that the industrial Commission commited reversible error
in refusing to order the Second Injury Fund to pay dependency benefits after
the expiration of the initial 312 week period.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT BY RESPONDENT
SECOND INJURY FUND

The obligation

of

the Second

Injury Fund

for dependency death

benefits was removed by Legislative amendment to Section 35-1-68, U.C.A.,

2

passed March 8, 1979, in effect May 8, 1979.

The amendment deleted the former

language in that Section asigning liability for continued dependency death
benefits to the Second Injury Fund and inserted new language specifically
assigning responsibility for all dependency death benefits to the employer or
insurance carrier.

ARGUMENT

I.

Prior to 1979, Section 35-1-68, U.C.A. assigned responsibility for

dependency death benefits to the employer or its insurance carrier from the
date of death to date not to exceed 312 weeks (6 years). Section 35-1-68 (2)
and 35-1-68 (3). Following the termination of that period, responsibility for
continued dependency death benefits was specifically assigned to the Second
Injury Fund (then called Special Fund) by subsections (4) and (5) of Section
35-1-68.

The pertinent language of Section 35-1-68 prior to its amendment in

1979 is as follows:
35-1-68.
Second injury fund created-Purpose-Funding-Injury causing
death-Filing
claim within
one year-payment
into fund when no
dependents-Payment to dependents-Presumptions of dependency-Payment to
partially dependent persons-Effect of remarriage.
In case injury causes death within the period of six years from the
date of the accident, the employer or insurance carrier shall pay the
burial expenses of the deceased as provided in section 35-1-81, and
further benefits in the amounts and to the persons as follows:
(1) If there are no dependents,. . . .
(2) If there are wholly dependent persons at the time of the
death, the payment shall be 66 2/3% of the decedent1 s average weekly wage
at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less
than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for
each dependent minor child under the age of eighteen years, up to a
maximum of four such dependent minor children not to exceed the average
weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not to exceed
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85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week,
to continue during dependency for the remainder of the period between the
date of the death and not to exceed six years or 312 weeks after the date
of the injury.
(3) If there are partly dependent persons at the time of the
death, the payment shall be 66 2/3% of the decedent's average weekly
wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of
the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not
less than a minimum of $45 per week, to continue during dependency for
the remainder of the period between the date of death and not to exceed
six years or 312 weeks after the date of injury as the commission in each
case may determine and shall not amount to more than a maximum of
$15,600. The benefits provided for in this subsection shall be in
keeping with the circumstances and conditions of dependency existing at
the date of injury, and any amount awarded by the commission under this
subsection must be consistent with the general provisions of this title.
(4) If there are wholly dependent persons and also partly dependent
persons at the time of death, the commission may apportion the benefits
as it deems just and equitable; provided, that the total benefits awarded
to all parties concerned shall not exceed the maximum provided for by
law. Following the period during which the employer or its insurance
carrier is required to pay benefits under this act, there shall be paid
to such persons, during the period of their dependency, out of the
special fund provided for in subsection (1), the same benefits as paid by
the employer or its insurance carrier, as provided in subsection (2) and
(3). The issue of dependency shall be reviewed at the time application
is made for additional benefits from the special fund, (emphasis supplied)
(5) • The commission shall order that, there be paid to such
dependents as provided in subsections (2) and (3), benefits at the rate
of 66 2/3% of the deceased's average weekly wages at the time of the
injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly
wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of
$45 per week, out of that special fund provided for in subsection (1) and
for that period of time beginning with the time that the payments to be
made by the employer or its insurance carrier terminate and ending upon
the termination of said dependency, (emphasis supplied)
(6)

II.

1979

Amendment:

Section

35-1-68

following

the

Legislative

amendment, effective May 8, 1979, reads as pertinent hereto as follows:
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35-1-68.
Second
injury
fund-Injury
causing
death-Burial
expenses-Payments by employer or insurance carrier-Filing claim within
one year-Payments to dependents-Review of dependency-Apportionment of
benefits (emphasis supplied)
\ Jm J

e

•

•

C

C

(2) In case injury causes death within the period of six years
from the date of the accident, the employer or insurance carrier shall
pay the burial expenses of the deceased as provided in section 35-1-81,
and further benefits in the amounts and to the persons as follows:
(a)
(b) (i) If there are wholly dependent persons at the time of the
death, the payment by the employer or insurance carrier shall be 66 2/3%
of the decedent1 s average weekly wage at the time of the injury, but not
more than a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time
of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus
$5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under the
age of eighteen years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor
children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the
time of the injury, but not to exceed 85% of the state average weekly
wage at the time of the injury per week, to continue during dependency
for the remainder of the period between the date of the death and not to
exceed six years or 312 weeks after the date of the injury.
(ii)
The weekly payment to wholly dependent persons during
dependency following the expiration of the first six-year period
described in subsection (2)(b)(i) shall be an amount equal to the weekly
benefits paid to those wholly dependent persons during the initial
six-year period, reduced by 50% of any weekly federal social security
death benefits paid to those wholly dependent persons.
(iii) The issue of dependency shall be subject to review by the
commission at the end of the initial six-year period and annually
thereafter. If in any such review it is determined that, under the facts
and circumstances existing at that time, the applicant is no longer a
wholly dependent person, the applicant may be considered a partly
dependent or non-dependent person and shall be paid such benefits as the
commission may determine pursuant to subsection (2)(c)(ii).
(iv) For purposes of any dependency determination, a surviving
spouse of a deceased employee shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly
dependent for a six-year period from the date of death of the employee.
This presumption shall not apply after the initial six-year period and,
in determining the then existing annual income of the surviving spouse,
the commission shall exclude 50% of any federal social security death
benefits received by that surviving spouse.
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(c) (i) If there are partly dependent persons at the time of the
death, the payment shall be 66 2/3% of the decedent's average weekly
wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of
the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not
less than a minimum of $45 per week, to continue during dependency for
the remainder of the period betwen the date of death and not to exceed
six years or 312 weeks after the date of injury as the commission in each
case may determine and shall not amount to more than a maximum of
$18,720. The benefits provided for in this subsection shall be in
keeping with the circumstances and conditions of dependency existing at
the date of injury, and any amount awarded by the commission under this
subsection must be consistent with the general provisions of this title.
(ii)
Benefits to persons determined to be partly dependent
pursuant to subsection (2)(b)(iii) shall be determined by the commission
in keeping with the circumstances and conditions of dependency existing
at the time of the dependency review and may be paid in a weekly amount
not exceeding the maximum weekly rate that partly dependent person would
receive if wholly dependent.
(iii) Payments under this section shall be paid to such persons
during their dependency by the employer or insurance carrier, (emphasis
supplied)
(d)
(e)
Analysis

of

the

dependency

death

benefit

provision

of Section

35-1-68 before and after the legislative amendments of 1979 reveals clearly
the change in responsibility for the payment of such benefits made by the
Legislature

in its enactment of the 1979 amendments.

Under the pre-1979

Statute the responsibility of the employer or insurance carrier is clearly
limited to the 312 weeks (6 year) period following the date of injury (death)
by

subsections

(2)

and

(3) while

subsections

(4)

and

(5)

of

35-1-68

unmistakably require the Special Fund to continue the same benefits during
their

continued

dependency

beyond

the termination of the employer/carrier

liability.
Likewise, the intent of the Legislature in the 1979 amendments to
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exempt the Second Injury Fund from future dependency death benefits and to
assign liability for such benefits to the employer/carrier is manifest beyond
question*
respect

All references
to

inserted

dependency

in

the

to the Special Fund

death

statute

benefits

expressly

were

(Second

deleted

assigning

the

dependency death benefits to the employer/carrier.

Injury Fund) with

and

new

language was

responsibility

for

all

What could be more clear

than the new language of Section 35-1-68 found in subsection (c) (iii) that:
Payments under this section shall be paid to such persons during
their dependency by the employer or insurance carrier.
In

summary,

the Legislature

in

its

1979

amendment

to Section

35-1-68 accomplished its dual objectives of (1) removing the Second Injury
Fund from any future liability for continued dependency death benefits and (2)
assigning

responsibility

insurance carrier.

for

all

such

benefits

to

the

employer

or

its

As the Industrial Commission indicated in its Denial of

Motion for Review, the 1979 amendments to this Section were in response to the
increasing

liability placed on the Second Injury Fund.

At the same time,

however, the impact upon the employer/carrier was alleviated by additional
amendments providing

for annual review of the dependency

issue after the

initial six year period, the exclusion of the dependency presumption after
that date and the offset of 50% of any federal social security death benefits
received by the surviving spouse.

Such changes, along with those made on the

dependency of spouses and minor children and the effect of remarriage of the
surviving

spouse,

operate

to

support

beyond

reasonable

controversy

the

decision of the Industrial Commission that the 1979 amendments to Section
35-1-68

effectively

removed

the

Second

continued dependency death benefits.
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Injury

Fund

from

liability

for

RESPONSE TO POSITION ASSERTED BY APPELLANT

The 1979 amendment to Section 35-1-68 removing the Second Injury
Fund

from

liability

for

continued

dependency

death

benefits

is neither

affected by nor inconsistent with Section 35-1-70 referred to by Appellant as
being determinative of its liability in this controversy.
Appellant has asserted that Section 35-1-70 somehow applies to this
case and operates to overcome and nullify the new language in Section 35-1-88
enacted

in 1979 carrying out the intent of the Legislature

(1) to assign

responsibility for continued dependency death benefits to the employer or its
insurance carrier and (2) to remove any liability for such benefits from the
Second Injury Fund.

As the Industrial Commission stated in its Denial of

Motion for Review, the "special cases" provision of Section 35-1-70 is not
contradictory to Section 35-1-68, as amended in 1979, and does not apply in
this controversy in any event.

As pointed out by the Commission, Section

35-1-70 gives the Commission, in its discretion, certain authority to continue
benefits

which

otherwise

would

have

been

terminated.

In

this

case,

applicant's benefits have not "otherwise been terminated"; therefore there is
no occasion for the Commission to exercise its discretion under 35-1-70.
In summary, Appellants reliance upon Section 35-1-70 is misplaced.
That Section was not intended nor does it operate to nullify the expressed
intent of the Legislature

in 1979 to remove the Second Injury Fund from

liability for continued dependency death benefits.
CONCLUSION

It was not error for the Commission to refuse to order the Second
Injury Fund to pay the continued dependency death benefits in this case.
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Analysis of the death benefit provisions of the Act, Section 35-1-68, before
and after its amendment in 1979 by the Utah Legislature reveals unmistakably
that

the

Legislature

intended

to

and

in

fact

clearly

accomplished

its

objectives (1) to remove the Second Injury Fund from its former liability for
continued dependency death benefits and (2) to assign responsibility for such
continued dependency benefits to the employer or its insurance carrier.

The

amendments which became effective May 8, 1979 are not in conflict with Section
35-1-70 as asserted by appellant nor are they nullified or modified by that
Section with respect to the liability of the Second Injury Fund in this case.

Respectfully submitted this 3d day of June, 1986.

r>/„. I'Erie V. Boorman
Administrator and Attorney
For the Respondent Second Injury Fund
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